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Comment
EMPLOYEE SOLICITATION RIGHTS IN THE HEALTH-CARE INDUSTRY-A
PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act (Act),' which comprehensively regu-
lates the relations between employers and employees, was amended in 1974
to extend its protections 2 to employees in the nonprofit health-care field. 3
The scope of these protections with respect to solicitation rights4 of employ-
ees has since been considered by the National Labor Relations Board
(Board),5 several federal courts of appeals,6 and the United States Supreme
Court. 7 Despite the considerable expenditure of time and energy by the
Board and the judiciary, very little in the area of employee solicitation rights
in the health-care field can be considered firmly settled.8
This comment will explore in detail the development of the well-settled
guidelines regarding employee solicitation in the industrial setting,9 and the
confusing application of these guidelines to situations involving the non-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
2. The dual purpose of the Act is to protect the employees' right to take con-
certed action as provided for in the Act, and to substitute collective bargaining for
economic warfare as a means of securing satisfactory wages and working conditions.
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). For a general discussion of the
numerous protections of the Act, see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW
(1976).
3. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395, § 1(a) (amending 29
U.S.C. § 152). Originally, the Act had exempted from the definition of employer
"any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." The 1974 Amend-
ments removed this exemption. For legislative history and a detailed analysis of the
1974 Amendments to the Act, see Vernon, Labor Relations in the Health Care Field Under
the 1974 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 202 (1975).
4. The term "solicitation" refers to the situation where an employee seeks to
inform a fellow employee about, or urge a fellow employee to join, a labor organiza-
tion. For a discussion of employee solicitation, see R. GORMAN, supra note 2, at 179.
5. For a discussion of Board decisions involving employee solicitation rights in
the health-care industry, see notes 57-81 and accompanying text infia.
6. For a discussion of federal appellate court decisions involving employee solici-
tation rights in the health-care industry, see notes 83-179 and accompanying text
infra.
7. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions involving employee solicitation
rights in the health-care industry, see notes 88-179 and accompanying text tnfia.
8. See Feheley, Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act." Health Care Institu-
tions, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 235, 291-97 (1975). For a discussion of the uncertain state of
labor law in this area, see notes 54-179 and accompanying text infra.
9. For a discussion of the industrial setting guidelines for employee solicitation,
see notes 22-53 and accompanying text infra.
(622)
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profit health-care industry.10 It will demonstrate that the cause for much of
this confusion is the Board's carryover of its approach to solicitation in the
industrial setting"' to the very different setting of a hospital or similar
health-care institution. 12 This comment will also show that, in recent years,
courts have added to this confusion by stating that they are applying the
industrial setting guidelines 13 to the health-care field, while actually creating
a separate body of law for solicitation problems in that setting.14
Next, this comment will demonstrate the rationality of applying the
"retail store exception"' 15 to cafeterias and gift shops located in health-care
facilities.' 6 This idea has been summarily rejected by the Board 1 7 and by
some members of the Supreme Court,'" but has been accepted by other
members of the Court' 9 as well as by a number of federal appellate court
judges.20
Lastly, this comment will focus upon a suggested analytical approach to
the problem of employee solicitation rights in health-care settings. This solu-
tion views the availability or nonavailability of alternative methods of reach-
ing health-care employees as the most important factor in determining the
extent of employees' solicitation rights. 2'
10. For a discussion of the application of the Board's industrial setting employee
solicitation guidelines to the health-care setting, see notes 54-179 and accompanying
text it/a.
11. For a discussion of the Board's approach to the problem in industrial set-
tings, see notes 22-53 and accompanying text inf/a.
12. The scope of the term "health-care institution" as used in the 1974 Amend-
ments to the Act is defined as follows: "The term 'health-care institution' shall in-
clude any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance organization, health
clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care of
sick, infirm or aged persons." 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1976).
13. For a discussion of various courts' purported application of the industry
guidelines on employee solicitation in the health-care situation, see notes 54-179 and
accompanying text it/a.
14. See notes 208-15 and accompanying text t/a.
15. For a discussion of the "retail store" exception, see notes 48-53 and accom-
panying text n/ja.
16. For a discussion of the "retail store exception" as it might apply in the
health-care setting, see notes 216-33 and accompanying text tnfa.
17. See Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 223 N.L.R.B. 1193 (1976). For a discus-
sion of the Board's decision in Beth Israel, see notes 113-17 and accompanying text
in/fa.
18. See Beth Israel Hosp* v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 505-07 (1978). For a discus-
sion of Beth Israel, see notes 88-136 and accompanying text inf/a.
19. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 513 (1978) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justices Burger and Rehnquist joined in Justice Powell's concurring opinion.
Id. at 508 (Powell, J., concurring). See also NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S.
773, 791 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring). For a discussion of Baptist Hospital, see
notes 137-67 and accompanying text it/a.
20. See St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368, 1375
& n.7 (10th Cir. 1977). See also Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 662 F.2d 56,
57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
21. For a discussion focusing on alternative methods of access to employees as a
1982-83]
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II. GUIDELINES REGARDING EMPLOYEE SOLICITATION IN THE
INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT
The analysis which follows will focus upon the propriety of extending
the Board's accepted rules of solicitation22 in industrial settings to similar
situations involving health-care institutions.23 In order to properly analyze
this question, however, it is first necessary to thoroughly understand the so-
licitation guidelines that have been developed relating to industrial
employers.
Section 7 of the Act provides that all employees covered by the Act are
guaranteed the right to organize and bargain collectively with their employ-
ers. 24 Furthermore, section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for any
employer covered by the Act to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."25 Thus, in the most
general sense, when a union solicits membership on an employer's premises
during working hours and the employer attempts to ban or hinder this activ-
ity, in most instances such conduct will constitute an unfair labor practice.
26
A. The Republic Aviation Presumptzon
The landmark case involving industrial solicitation rights is Republic Avi-
ation Corp. v. NLRB. 27 There, the employer, Republic Aviation Corp. (Re-
public), was a rapidly expanding manufacturer of military aircraft.28 Long
before any union organizational efforts had commenced, Republic instituted
a company rule banning all forms of solicitation, whether conducted during
working hours or during break times. 29 After having been warned that he
could be disciplined for violating Republic's broad no-solicitation rule, an
employee persisted in soliciting his fellow workers during lunch breaks and
possible solution to the health-care solicitation problem, see notes 234-38 and accom-
panying text thfra.
22. For a discussion of the Board's solicitation guidelines, see notes 23-53 and
accompanying text ifra.
23. For a discussion of the Board's approach to solicitation problems in the
health-care industry, see notes 54-66 and accompanying text infra.
24. Section 7 of the Act provides as follows:
[E]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
158(a) (3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
25. Id § 158(a)(1).
26. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
27. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
28. Id. at 794.
29. Id at 795. The text of the rule involved in Republic Aviation was quite brief:
"Soliciting of any type cannot be permitted in the factory or offices." Id
[Vol. 28: p. 622
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was dismissed. 30 In deciding the case, the Board attempted to strike a bal-
ance between the interests of the employer of maintaining discipline and
maximizing work efficiency, and the interests of the employees who sought
to exercise their guaranteed right to organize.3 1 It applied a presumption,
first articulated in Peyton Packing Co. ,32 that absent special circumstances, a
broad rule banning solicitation by employees during nonworking time is in-
valid.33 This presumption was specifically approved when Republic Aviation
reached the Supreme Court, and hence, became known as the "Republi Avia-
tion presumption of invalidity." 34 This standard has become the starting
point from which the law regarding employee solicitation rights has evolved.
The effect of this presumption was to place upon the employer the burden of
proving that special circumstances existed which made a broad no-solicita-
tion rule necessary in order to maintain satisfactory levels of production or
discipline. 35 Upon such a showing, the promulgation of a broad rule, such
as the one involved in Republic Aviation, would be justifiable since the em-
ployer's interest in safety and efficiency would be viewed as outweighing the
employee's organizational rights.
36
B. Special Circumstances Sufficient to Rebut the Presumption of Invalidity
Cases elucidating the "special circumstances" sufficient to rebut the Re-
pubhc Aviation presumption have been rare.37 However, such special circum-
stances were found present in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB. 38 The
employer in McDonnell Douglas banned solicitation by off-duty employees in
nonwork areas at all times except for a "reasonable" period of time before
their shifts began and after they had ended. 39 The employer's purported
30. Id. The employee engaged in union solicitation by passing out union appli-
cation cards to his fellow employees. Id This was done on his own time only, during
lunch periods at the plant. Id.
31. See Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1192-96 (1943).
32. 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 730 (1944).
33. See id. at 843-44.
34. Set R. GORMAN, supra note 2, at 179-81.
35. See 324 U.S. at 793. For a discussion of the special circumstances which
could be held to overcome the presumption, see notes 38-53 and accompanying text
infra.
36. For a discussion of cases where the employer's interests did outweigh those of
the employees, see notes 37-53 and accompanying text infra.
37. See Feheley, supra note 8, at 291-92. Feheley gives examples of justifications
for broad no-solicitation and/or distribution rules. Id. These justifications include
keeping the premises clean and orderly, maintaining discipline, maintaining produc-
tion levels, preventing accidents, preventing the creation of a hostile working envi-
ronment and avoiding detrimental effects upon the employer's business resulting
from organizational efforts. Id
38. 472 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1973).
39. Id at 542. The company's rule on solicitation was, in pertinent part, as
follows:
By employees
Employees are permitted to engage in word of mouth solicitation (for mem-
1982-83]
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justifications for its rule were (1) that a broad rule was necessary due to the
unusually large number of employees working at the plant, 40 (2) the large
amount of non-work space present on the plant grounds, 4' and, most impor-
tant, (3) the fact that much of the employer's production involved military
matters classified as secret by the federal government. 4 2 The Board applied
the customary presumption of invalidity as set out in Republtic Aviation ,43 and
found that the evidence offered by McDonnell Douglas did not amount to
special circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption. 4
4
The Eighth Circuit, however, denied enforcement and remanded, stat-
ing that the Board had failed to give sufficient weight to the employer's evi-
dence concerning the security risks involved, 45 and found that the Board had
merely paid lip-service to the balancing called for by Republic Aviation 46 The
court thus necessarily implied that security considerations might sometimes
amount to special circumstances sufficient to rebut the Republic Aviation pre-
sumption of invalidity.
4 7
1. The Retail Store Exception
The most common illustration of special circumstances which are suffi-
cient to rebut the Repubh'c Aviation presumption is the so-called "retail store
exception" that was first articulated in May Department Stores Co. 48 There, the
employer, a St. Louis department store chain, issued a broad ban on all
forms of solicitation at any time and in any area of the store, unless prior
bership, signatures, etc.), either in or outside their work areas, so long as this
is done during non-working times.
By non-employees *
Non-employees are not permitted to engage in solicitation anywhere on
company premises at any time.
*NOTE: Employees are not allowed on company premises except during
their scheduled working hours and a reasonable period before and after
those hours. At other times, they are to be treated as non-employees.
Id It was the treatment of employees soliciting on the premises other than during
break times and a reasonable time before and after their work hours as nonemployees
that was challenged as violative of the Act. Id.
40. Id. at 541.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. For a discussion of the Republic Aviation presumption of invalidity, see notes
27-36 and accompanying text supra.
44. McDonnell Douglas Corp. and Technical Employees of Aerospace Mfrs.,
194 N.L.R.B. 514 (1971).
45. 472 F.2d at 545-46.
46. For a discussion of the balancing called for by Republic Aviation, see notes 27-
36 and accompanying text supra.
47. 472 F.2d at 545-46. On remand, the Board reappraised the facts on the
record in light of the Eighth Circuit's opinion and found that McDonnell Douglas
had shown sufficient justification for the rule in question due to the need for special
security. McDonnell Douglas Corp. and Technical Employees of Aerospace Mfrs.,
204 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1973). The Board therefore dismissed the complaint. Id.
48. 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944).
[Vol. 28: p. 622
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written permission from the company had been obtained.4 9 The Board ap-
plied the Republic Aviation presumption 50 and found this broad rule invalid
but "only as it prohibit[ed] union solicitation offthe selling floor during non-
working hours." 5' The Board found that as to solicitation on the selling floor,
the rule was valid, indicating that the factor which tipped the balance in the
employer's favor was the potential for disruption of the employer's busi-
ness.52 Therefore, whenever an employer in a retail industry promulgates a
broad no-solicitation rule applicable to all customer access areas, the rule
will be presumptively valid absent a showing of discriminatory
application.
53
III. EMPLOYEE SOLICITATION PROBLEMS IN THE HEALTH-CARE FIELD
A. Pre-Amendment Decisions
As noted above, before it was amended in 1974, the Act did not apply to
nonprofit hospitals.54 Nevertheless, the Board had faced the problem of so-
licitation in the health-care industry in cases involving profit-making institu-
tions prior to the amendments.55 However, no clear standard evolved from
a trilogy of Board decisions.
56
49. Id. at 1004 (intermediate report of hearing examiner). The company circu-
lated a bulletin directed to all company employees which stated as follows:
Your attention is directed to a long-standing policy of this company with
references to solicitation of our employees.
No one, whether an employee or non-employee of this company, shall solicit
for, nor shall any employee purchase insurance, periodicals, magazines,
merchandise from outside sources or tickets; prizes for churches or lodges;
punch boards or raffles; or memberships in societies, lodges or organizations
of any kind.
Where employees desire to solicit for funeral flowers, wedding gifts, sickness
or accident benefits, Christmas presents or presents of any kind, in short,
collections of any amount however small, or for any purpose however de-
serving, they must first obtain written permission.
It is not the intention of the Management to interfere with any voluntary
expressions of good-will on the part of any of our co-workers for other co-
workers. Permission therefore, will be granted in every case where no impo-
sition or hardship will result. We shall, however, view with severity any
omission to secure written permission, as stated.
Please make this notice known to every employee in your department as
indicated by each employee's signature hereon, and return to the Superin-
tendent's office.
Id.
50. For a discussion of the Republic Aviation presumption, see notes 27-36 and
accompanying text supra.
51. 59 N.L.R.B. at 981. (Emphasis added).
52. Id
53. Id. For circumstances which could lead to a finding of discriminatory appli-
cation, see R. GORMAN, supra note 2, at 179-94.
54. See note 3 supra.
55. For a discussion of health-care solicitation problems in pre-1974 cases in-
volving profit-making institutions, see notes 57-66 and accompanying text supra.
56. The lack of a clear standard from these decisions was noted by the Supreme
1982-83]
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The first of those decisions, Summit Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc. "
involved a broad no-solicitation rule which had been promulgated in re-
sponse to a union organizing campaign. 58 Upon a challenge by two nurses
who had been disciplined for violating the rule, the Board found the rule
presumptively invalid on its face, and overturned the finding of the trial
examiner that the special circumstances of a health-care setting necessitated
the allowance of a broader rule.5 9 In Guyan Valley Hospital, Inc. ,6 decided the
same year as Summit Nursing Home, the Board accepted the trial examiner's
finding that, even if the broad rule6' were presumptively invalid, the fact
that it was enforced in a hospital and not a plant amounted to special cir-
cumstances which justified the broad rule.62 The trial examiner in Guyan
Valley Hospital had noted that hearing pro-union or anti-union discussions
might upset patients, and stated that the hospital need not wait for the ill-
effects of such discussions to manifest themselves before implementing a
more restrictive employee solicitation rule.63 In the last of the three cases,
Bellaire General Hospital,64 the Board unanimously found that a broad rule 65
promulgated by the hospital violated section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 66
Court in Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 493, 494 (1976). For a discussion of
Beth Israel, see notes 88-136 and accompanying text infra.
57. 196 N.L.R.B. 769 (1972).
58. The rule stated as follows:
In order to give our undivided attention to the job of caring for our pa-
tients, no employee shall engage in solicitation for any cause or distribute
literature of any kind during an employee's working time at any place in
the home. No employee should engage in solicitation of distribution of
literature at any time in the patient or public area within the home, or in
the nurses' stations. No employee shall distribute literature for any cause in
working areas of the home at any time.
Id. at 769.
59. Id. at 769-70.
60. 198 N.L.R.B. 107 (1972).
61. The rule in Guyan Valley Hospital stated that "[t]here is to be no soliciting in
working areas, during working hours of the hospital." Id. at 111.
62. Id.
63. Id
64. 203 N.L.R.B. 1105 (1973).
65. The rule in Bellaire General Hospital stated as follows:
The hospital will not permit any type of selling or solicitation within the
hospital or on its property without written consent of the Administrator or
his delegate, by any third person on any occasion or by employees while off-
duty or during working hours, or under any circumstances where it will
interfere with the work of others.
This provision does not apply to activity of the Women's Auxiliary or to
any firm or individual supplying the needs of the hospital itself. No person
shall remain on the premises of the hospital at any time when not on duty,
for any purpose.
Id at 1108.
66. Id. at 1106.
[Vol. 28: p. 622
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B. Post-Amendment Decisions
1. The Board's Position
The 1974 Amendment made the Act generally applicable to nonprofit
health-care facilities and the Board had its first opportunity to state its posi-
tion on employee solicitation rights in those facilities in St. John's Hospital &
School of Nursing, Inc. 67 There, the employer hospital had promulgated a
broad no-solicitation rule which banned solicitation by employees for any
purpose in all working areas of the hospital as well as in all areas to which
patients or visitors had access.68 After learning that three employees had
engaged in a discussion concerning the possibility of unionizing, the hospital
reprimanded the employees involved and warned that further such discus-
sions would result in harsher disciplinary measures. 69 The union brought a
challenge before the Board, alleging that the hospital's promulgation of the
rule constituted an unfair labor practice.70 The hospital defended its rule on
the basis that its concern with providing a tranquil atmosphere justified a
broader rule than was allowable in industrial settings.7" The union argued
that a hospital should be treated in the same fashion as any other employer
for solicitation purposes,72 thus calling for the application of the Republic Avi-
ation presumption of invalidity subject to rebuttal by a showing of special
circumstances. 73
The Board, in a decision that became typical in this area,74 recognized
that the necessity of a tranquil atmosphere in some areas of the hospital
justified the imposition of a somewhat more stringent rule regarding solicita-
tion rights of employees. 75 However, it refused to accept the hospital's con-
67. 222 N.L.R.B. 1150 (1976).
68. The hospital's no-solicitation rule read as follows:
Except to solicit participation in official hospital employee programs, no
employee shall solicit any other employee of the hospital for any purpose
during working time or in the working areas of the hospital, or in any areas
of the hospital, or in any area to which patients and visitors have access. No
employee shall distribute any matter of any kind in any area of the hospital
except in nonworking areas where patients and visitors do not have access.
At no time shall any employees solicit any patients or visitor for any pur-
pose nor shall any employee distribute any matter to any patients or visi-
tors. This rule will be strictly enforced.
Id
69. Id. at 1152-53.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1150. The American Hospital Association urged this contention along
with St. John's Hospital. Id The argument was based upon the premise that the
function of patient care requires that a hospital's rendering of services must be free
from any disruption that might result from any kind of solicitation in the public
areas of the hospital. Id
72. Id
73. For a discussion of the Republic Aviation presumption of invalidity, see notes
27-36 and accompanying text supra.
74. For a discussion of other Board decisions on the subject, see notes 83-94 &
143-47 and accompanying text supra.
75. 222 N.L.R.B. at 1150.
1982-83]
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tention that its broad rule was wholly justified on that basis. 76 The Board
held that only "strictly patient care areas" warranted such special considera-
tion. 7 7 Thus, without expressly saying so, the Board applied the well-settled
industrial guidelines regarding employee solicitation rights and found that
the need for a tranquil atmosphere in what it termed "strictly patient care
areas" amounted to a special circumstance sufficient to rebut the presump-
tion of invalidity.
78
The Board also briefly expressed its view on the applicability of the so
called "retail-store exception ' 79 by summarily rejecting the hospital's argu-
ment that the exception should apply to the cafeteria and gift shop in the
hospital. 80 The Board ordered the protection of solicitation rights in those
areas, concluding that the basic function of the hospital was patient care and
that the hospital had not shown that its broad no-solicitation rule for all
areas was necessary to avoid disruption of that function. 8 1
2. A Split in the Courts of Appeals
The Board's position, as espoused in St. John's Hospital, has not been
uniformly enforced by the federal appellate courts.82 The First Circuit
83
and the Seventh Circuit 4 have enforced Board orders protecting employee
76. Id
77. Id. The Board explained the distinction between "strictly patient care areas"
and other areas of the hospital as follows:
For example, a hospital may be warranted in prohibiting solicitation even
on nonworking time in strictly patient care areas, such as patients' rooms,
operating rooms, and places where patients receive treatment, such as x-ray
and therapy areas. Solicitation at any time in those areas might be unset-
tling to the patients-particularly those who are seriously ill and thus need
quiet and peace of mind.
Id
78. Id
79. For a discussion of the "retail store exception," see notes 48-53 and accom-
panying text supra. See also R. GORMAN, supra note 2, at 181.
80. 222 N.L.R.B. at 1150-51 n.3. In this footnote, the Board opined that the
hospital's reliance on May Department Stores was misplaced because a hospital's main
function is patient care while the main function of a retail establishment is selling
merchandise. Id. This brief footnote is the only portion of the Board's opinion focus-
ing upon the hospital's contention that its rule was justified under the retail store
exception. Id.
81. Id
82. For the standard of review in administrative law cases, see the Administra-
tive Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1976). Generally, the standard of review for an
appellate court review of a Board decision requires that the Board's findings of fact
must be respected if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See
id. The Board's interpretations of specific provisions of the Act are to be given "con-
siderable deference in light of the Board's 'special function of applying the general
provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.' " St. John's Hosp. &
School of Nursing v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368, 1371-72 (1977). See also R. GORMAN,
supra note 2, at 49.
83. See NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 554 F.2d 447 (1st Cir. 1977).
84. Lutheran Hosp. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 28: p. 622
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solicitation rights in hospital cafeterias and coffeeshops. However, the Sixth
Circuit,85 the Tenth Circuit in St. John's Hospital86 and the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit8 7 have denied enforcement of similar Board orders which
pertained to cafeterias as well as to other patient-access areas.
3. The Supreme Court Confronts the Issue
a. Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB
On the basis of this split in the decisions of the federal courts of ap-
peal,88 the Supreme Court, in 1978, granted certiorari in Beth Israel Hospital
v. NLRB. 8 9 The hospital was a large nonprofit hospital which, prior to any
union organizational efforts, had instituted a policy of banning solicitation
in any area accessible to visitors or patients. 90 The rule effectively allowed
solicitation only in certain locker rooms and adjoining restrooms, which were
used solely by employees, and prevented solicitation in the hospital cafeteria,
"a common gathering room for employees" and a room where fewer than
two percent of the patrons were patients. 9 ' A hospital employee distributed
a union newsletter in the cafeteria despite a hospital warning that such con-
duct violated the hospital's no-solicitation rule and that further solicitation
efforts would result in dismissal. 92 The union then charged that the hospi-
tal's conduct violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act.9 3
The Board agreed with the union and held that the hospital's rule vio-
lated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act. 94  The First Circuit subse-
85. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 576 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1978).
86. See St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th
Cir. 1977).
87. Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
88. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 489 n.5 (1978).
89. 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
90. Id. at 486-87. The rule imposed by the hospital stated in pertinent part as
follows:
There is to be no soliciting of the general public (patients, visitors) on Hos-
pital property. Soliciting and distribution of literature to B.I. employees
may be done by other B.I. employees, when neither individual is on his or
her working time, in employee only areas-employee locker rooms and cer-
tain adjacent restrooms. Elsewhere within the Hospital including patient-
care and all other work areas, and areas open to the public such as lobbies,
cafeteria and coffee shop, corridors, elevators, gift shop, etc., there is to be
no solicitation or distribution of literature.
Solicitation or distribution of literature on Hospital property by non-em-
ployees is expressly prohibited at all times.
Consistent with our long-standing practices, the annual appeal campaign of
the United Fund and the Combined Jewish Philanthropies for voluntary
charitable gifts will continue to be carried out by the Hospital.
Id
91. Id. at 490.
92. Id. at 491-92.
93. Id. at 487. For a discussion of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act, see notes 24-
26 and accompanying text supra.
94. Beth Israel Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1193 (1976).
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quently enforced the Board's order, applying the traditional presumption of
invalidity and finding that the hospital had failed to produce evidence suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption. 95 When the case reached the Supreme
Court, the sole issue remaining was the propriety of the hospital's no-solicita-
tion rule as applied to the cafeteria and coffee shop.96 After conducting a
thorough analysis of the Board's general approach to solicitation problems in
industrial settings, 97 the Court denied, in succession, each of the hospital's
challenges to the Board's qualified extension of the Republic Aviation ap-
proach to the hospital setting.
98
The hospital first argued that the application of the Republic Aviation
presumption of invalidity99 to the health-care field was inconsistent with the
congressional policy behind the 1974 Amendments to the Act.100 The hospi-
tal contended that the legislative history, taken in conjunction with the lan-
guage of the amendments, evinced a congressional intent either to prohibit
solicitation in the health-care industry entirely, or, in the alternative, to limit
solicitation to the extent allowed by the Board at the time the 1974 amend-
ments were enacted. 0 1 The Court rejected this argument, stating that,
while special provisions had been made in the amendments to protect health
care institutions against strikes by their employees, 10 2 comparable provisions
were not enacted regarding solicitation.10 3 The Court concluded that this
distinction manifested a congressional intent to leave to the Board the duty
of balancing the conflicting interests of the parties involved' 0 4 in the same
fashion as the Board had done in the industrial setting. 0 5
Secondly, the hospital argued that any conclusion regarding the possi-
95. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 554 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977).
96. See 437 U.S. at 485-86. Although the Court formally stated the issue in these
narrow terms, there is language in the opinion which broadly hints that the decision
encompasses more. See id. at 489.
97. Id. at 491-94.
98. Id. at 494-507.
99. For a discussion of the Republic Aviation presumption, see notes 27-36 and
accompanying text supra.
100. 437 U.S. at 496. For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1974
Amendments to the Act, see Vernon, supra note 3, at 203-05.
101. 437 U.S. at 496.
102. Id. at 496-97 n.12. Section 1(d) of the 1974 Act required, in situations in-
volving health-care institutions, 90 days notice of termination or expiration of a con-
tract, 60 days notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and
30 days notice to the FMCS respecting initial contract negotiation disputes arising
after recognition of the union. Id. at 496 n.12.
In addition, § l(e) of the 1974 Act required labor organizations to provide 10-
day strike notice to both the health-care institution and the FMCS prior to engaging
in picketing, strikes, or other concerted refusals to work. Id. These provisions pro-
vided for a special procedure to be followed in health-care strike situations and the
Court found the absence of such special provisions in the Act regarding health-care
solicitation dispositive. Id.
103. Id. at 496-97.
104. d. at 497.
105. Id. at 500.
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ble disruption of patient care brought about by solicitation efforts in the
cafeteria was a medical judgment and, therefore, was beyond the Board's
expertise.' 0 6 On this basis, the hospital argued that the Court should engage
in a more rigorous review than normally applied in administrative cases.l 0
The Court rejected this argument, maintaining that the Board's role is to
establish the nation's basic labor policies and that, in fulfilling this role, the
Board is continually called upon to make many general labor decisions in
areas where it lacks special expertise.' 08 Thirdly, the hospital argued that
the Board's decision lacked evidentiary support and was irrational.' 0 9 The
Court found that under the facts of the case, particularly those that showed
that only 1.56% of the cafeteria patrons were patients and that other forms of
solicitation had been tolerated, the Board's order was not irrational. 110
The hospital's final contention was that the retail store exception, 11
which, in the retail industry, allows a ban on all solicitation on the selling
floor because of the potential ill effects on customers, should apply in the
same fashion to a hospital cafeteria as it does to the dining areas of a public
restaurant.1 12 The Court observed that the Board had struck a "balance be-
tween organizational and employer rights" in formulating the retail store
exception.1 13 The primary purpose of a restaurant is to serve customers, but,
the Court reasoned, the primary purpose of a hospital is to serve the physical
and emotional needs of its patients.' 14 These needs, the Court concluded,
were not served in the cafeteria and therefore, the retail store exception was
rejected. 115
In summary, the Court in Beth Israel adopted the Board's approach to
solicitation problems in the health-care field as first formulated in St. John's
106. Id
107. For a discussion of the general standard of review of Board decisions, see
note 82 supra.
108. 437 U.S. at 501. The Court stated:
It is true that the Board is not expert in the delivery of health-care services,
but neither is it in pharmacology, chemical manufacturing, lumbering,
shipping, or any of a host of varied and specialized business enterprises over
which the Act confers jurisdiction. But the Board is expert in federal na-
tional labor relations policy, and it is in the Board, not petitioner, that the
1974 Amendments vested responsibility for developing that policy in the
health-care industry.
Id
109. Id at 501.
110. Id. at 501-02. The Court noted that the evidence showed that "patient use
of the cafeteria [was] voluntary, random, and infrequent" and that less than 2% of
the cafeteria patrons were patients. Id Thus, the Court concluded that the Board's
decision contained adequate evidentiary support to withstand an attack on irration-
ality grounds. Id
111. For a discussion of the retail store exception, see notes 48-53 and accompa-
nying text supra.
112. 437 U.S. at 505-06.
113. Id at 506.
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Hospital.'1 6 The Court further held that the Board had given sufficient
weight to the hospital's evidence regarding the need for tranquility in the
hospital cafeteria and that the court of appeals had not "grossly misapplied"
the applicable standards of law in finding the hospital's broad rule violative
of the Act.' 1 7 In closing, however, the Court agreed with the First Circuit's
observation that the "guidelines are still in flux and are far from self-
defining."' 18
Significantly, the Court also noted in its opinion that "[w]hile outside of
the health-care context, the availability of alternative means of communica-
tion is not, with respect to employee organizational activity, a necessary in-
quiry .. .it may be that the importance of the employer's interest here
demands the use of a more finely calibrated scale."' 19 While the existence of
alternative methods of reaching employees received only brief mention and
was not dispositive in Beth Israel, later cases would attempt to place more
emphasis on the existence of alternative means, citing to the above quote
from Beth Israel. 120
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice Rehnquist, took exception to the majority's wholesale rejec-
tion of the retail store exception. 12 1 Justice Blackmun agreed that in this
unusual situation, where less than two percent of the cafeteria patrons were
patients, the cafeteria more closely resembled a plant cafeteria, and there-
fore, there was a lack of the special circumstances needed to justify applying
the exception. 122 However, Justice Blackmun expressed concern that the
Court's holding might be uncritically applied to a more representative hospi-
tal cafeteria where a greater number of the patrons were patients and visi-
tors.i 2 3 Such an application, he observed, might take the Court further in
the direction of freer solicitation rights than it would have done had a more
representative fact pattern been the first to appear before the Court.' 24 Fi-
nally, Justice Blackmun stressed that a hospital, unlike the typical industrial
setting, contributes a unique factor-human suffering-to the typical labor
dispute, 125 and concluded that the Board may have lost sight of this distinc-
116. 437 U.S. at 502. For a discussion of the Board's approach as formulated in
St. John's Hospital, see notes 67-81 and accompanying text supra.
117. Id at 507.
118. Id at 507-08 (citing NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 554 F.2d at 481).
119. Id at 505.
120. For a discussion of alternative means of communicating with employees as
a factor in determining the extent of allowable employee solicitation, see notes 157-
58, 169-79, & 234-38 and accompanying text tnfra.
121. 437 U.S. at 508 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
122. Id at 509 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
123. Id
124. Id
125. Id Justice Blackmun observed that "[h]ospitals, after all, are not factories
or mines or assembly plants. They are hospitals where human ailments are treated,
where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional strain and worry, where
pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the day's activity. . . ." Id.
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tion in its preoccupation with resolving the problems between labor and
management. 126
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
filed another concurring opinion.12 7 Justice Powell maintained that the dif-
ference between industrial establishments, where employees do not generally
come in contact with nonemployees during their working hours, and hospi-
tals, where employees constantly mingle with patients and visitors during
their workdays, made the Republic Aviation presumption inapplicable in hos-
pital settings. 128 Justice Powell further argued that the presence of nonem-
ployees in a hospital cafeteria would justify a broad no-solicitation rule for
the same reasons that underlie the retail store exception.1 2 9 Nonetheless,
despite these significant disagreements with the majority's reasoning, Justice
Powell concurred in the Court's judgment, since he believed that the hospi-
tal had failed to produce any evidence of a reasonable possibility that solici-
tation would cause harm to visitors or patients.130 However, he warned that
Beth Israel presented an unusual situation and that most hospitals would be
able to produce such evidence. 13 1
Despite the comprehensive analysis by the Beth Israel Court, many ques-
tions remained unanswered concerning the extent to which hospitals and
other health-care institutions could ban solicitation. 132 This was primarily
the result of the narrow focus of the Court's decision in Beth Israel.' 33 On its
face, the case dealt only with prohibition of solicitation in the hospital cafe-
teria.' 34 Further, there were ambiguities in the majority opinion' 35 as well
126. Id.
127. Id at 509 (Powell, J., concurring).
128. Id at 511 (Powell, J., concurring). He noted that "[t]he rationality found
to exist in Republic Aviation, and therefore the validity of the presumption, cannot be
transferred automatically to other workplaces, for to do so would sever the connec-
tion between the presumption and the underlying proof." Id
129. Id at 513 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell continued as follows:
The hospital's function in serving patients, their families, and visitors is
much like the retail establishment's function in serving its customers. That
a non-profit hospital does not share the profit motive of a retail establish-
ment does not diminish the hospital employer's professional concern for the
welfare of those in its care, including not only patients but also their friends
and relatives who come to visit.
Id.
130. Id. at 516-17 (Powell, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 517 (Powell, J., concurring).
132. See text accompanying notes 133-36 thnra.
133. 437 U.S. at 489. The Court noted that of the approximately 2,200 regular
hospital employees, many had no access to the areas where employee solicitation was
permitted. Id The situation in Beth Israel was factually distinct from that which
would exist in many health-care facilities, and the Court noted that the cafeteria was
a "common gathering room for employees." Id. at 490.
134. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
135. See 437 U.S. at 483. The majority opinion failed to spell out clearly the
significance of the peculiar fact situation to its decision. Id The concurring opinions
recognized this failure on the part of the majority. Id at 508 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); Id at 509 (Powell, J., concurring). The majority opinion in Beth Israel was also
1982-831
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss3/4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
as strong reservations concerning the majority's approach expressed in the
concurring opinions. 1
36
b. NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc.
Only one year after Beth Israel, the Supreme Court was confronted with
some of the questions that had arisen in the wake of that decision in the case
of NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc. 137 Baptist Hospital was a large nonprofit
hospital with approximately 1,800 employees.1 38 Partly in response to union
organizational efforts, 139 the hospital promulgated a rule banning solicita-
tion at any time in any area utilized by or accessible to the public. 140 Specif-
ically included within this ban were the cafeteria, lobbies, gift shop, and first
floor entrances, in addition to hallways and restrooms on other floors.14 1 In
response to this rule, charges were filed with the Board on the grounds that
the hospital had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 142
The Board applied the Republic Aviation presumption of invalidity and
found the hospital's no-solicitation rule unlawful because it applied to all
areas, and was not limited to strictly patient care areas. 143 It was only in
these latter areas that the Board believed there were special circumstances
unclear regarding its rationale for rejecting the application of the retail store excep-
tion to health-care insitutions. d. at 505-07. For a discussion of the Court's response
to the retail store exception issue, see notes 111-15 and accompanying text supra.
136. For a discussion of the concurring justices' disagreements with the majority
opinion, see notes 121-31 and accompanying text supra.
137. 442 U.S. 773 (1979).
138. Id at 775.
139. Id. The union, Local 150-T, Service Employees Union, AFL-CIO, had be-
gun a campaign to organize the workers at Baptist Hospital in August, 1974. Id
140. Id. at 776. The hospital's newly adopted rule read as follows:
No solicitation of any kind, including solicitations for memberships or sub-
scriptions, will be permitted by employees at any time, including work time
and non-work time in any area of the Hospital which is accessible to or
utilized by the public. Anyone who does so will be subject to disciplinary
action. In those work areas of the Hospital not accessible to or utilized by
the public, no solicitations of any kind, including solicitations for member-
ships or subscriptions will be permitted at any time by employees who are
supposed to be working, or in such a way as to interfere with the work of
other employees who are supposed to be working. Anyone who does so and
thereby neglects his work or interferes with the work of others will likewise
be subject to disciplinary action.
Id
141. Id at 775-76.
142. Id at 776.
143. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 344, 355-58 (1976). The trial examiner's
decision, which was adopted as modified by the full Board, acknowledged that pa-
tient care is the primary concern of hospitals and that some medical experts sincerely
believe that broad solicitation rules such as the one in Baptist Hospital are necessary
for the patients' well-being. Id at 356. However, this evidence was not found to be
dispositive. Id Rather, it presented the very question at issue: whether evidence of
this type sufficiently outweighed the employees' guaranteed organizational rights so
as to justify such broad rules. Id
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present which were sufficient to rebut the presumption.' 4 4 The Sixth Circuit
reversed, however, finding that the hospital had overcome the presumption
of invalidity 4 5 through the presentation of medical evidence, thus justifying
its broad rule. 146 The testimony presented by the hospital generally showed
that there might be ill-effects on the recovery of patients who witnessed
union solicitation efforts.
147
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, faced with an inquiry
broader than that in Beth Israel,148 decided that the proper resolution of the
case lay in a middle ground between the position of the Board' 4 9 and that of
the Sixth Circuit. 150 In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court
agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the testimony offered by medical experts
and hospital administrators' 5' justified the no-solicitation rule as it applied
to the corridors, sitting rooms, and other areas of the hospital above the first
floor. 152 As to the cafeteria, lobbies and gift shop, however, the Court con-
cluded that the hospital presented insufficient evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption of invalidity and thus found that a complete ban on solicitation in
such areas was not warranted.' 53 Of critical importance was the fact that
the Court did sanction the use of the Republic Aviation presumption in a hos-
pital setting,' 54 despite expressing at more than one point its discomfort with
"a presumption as to hospitals so sweeping that it embraces solicitation in
the corridors and sitting rooms on floors occupied by patients."'
' 55
Echoing a closing comment made in Beth Israel,'56 the Court noted that
the existence of alternative means of reaching employees for oganizational
purposes, although not itself dispositive, lent support to permitting a partial
ban on solicitation, 15 7 thus emphasizing a consideration which would be ir-
144. Id at 358.
145. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 576 F.2d 107, 109-11 (6th Cir. 1978).
146. Id
147. Id The hospital's Chief of Medical Staff testified that patients and their
families may be disturbed upon seeing that the minds of hospital employees, in whose
care patients are entrusted, are on something other than patient care. Id. at 109. He
further testified that there was a need for a broad no-solicitation rule because even if
the patient is not directly affronted, "an event which disturbs the visiting family
invariably gets back to the patient." Id.
148. 442 U.S. at 782.
149. See Baptist Hosp., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 344 (1976). For a discussion of the
Board's opinion, see notes 143-44 and accompanying text supra.
150. 442 U.S. at 782. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in part
and vacated and remanded in part. Id. at 790-91.
151. 442 U.S. at 785-86.
152. Id
153. Id at 786.
154. See id.
155. Id at 788.
156. See 437 U.S. at 505. For a discussion of Beth Israel, see notes 88-136 and
accompanying text supra.
157. 442 U.S. at 785 (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. at 505). For
a discussion of Beth Israel, see notes 88-136 and accompanying text supra.
1982-831
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relevant in an industrial context. 158
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun expressed his continued fail-
ure to see any rational basis for not applying the retail store exception to a
gift shop or cafeteria located in a hospital.' 59 Justice Blackmun further
noted that the majority's admonition against the blind application of the
Republic Aviation presumption could not be overemphasized. 160 Similarly,
the Chief Justice filed a concurring opinion stating that the application of
the Republic Aviatin presumption of invalidity to a hospital setting was
"wholly irrational."' 6 ' He emphasized the difference between a normal in-
dustrial setting and a hospital, and maintained that any doubts as to the
potential adverse effects on patients should be resolved in favor of the pa-
tients. 162 Thus, Chief Justice Burger suggested that, when dealing with a
health-care institution, a different analysis should be used, giving greater sig-
nificance to the nature of the institution as opposed to merely making it a
factor in determining whether there are "special circumstances" sufficient to
rebut the Republic Aviation presumption.16 3 Nevertheless, the Chief Justice
concurred because he agreed that the Board lacked substantial evidence to
support a solicitation ban on the upper floors of the hospital. 1
64
In the final concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
White and Marshall, 165 noted that while the majority's opinion did not re-
ject the applicability of the Republic Aviation presumption, it did question the
appropriateness of applying the presumption to the sitting rooms and corri-
158. For a discussion of the method of analysis in the industrial context, see
notes 22-53 and accompanying text supra.
159. 442 U.S. at 791 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
160. Id Justice Blackmun referred to footnote 16 of the majority opinion which
stated as follows:
The Board, in reviewing the scope and application of its presumption,
should take into account that a modern hospital houses a complex array of
facilities and techniques for patient care and therapy that defy simple clas-
sification. . . . In different hospitals, the use and physical layout of such a
variety of areas may require varying resolutions of questions about the va-
lidity of bans on union solicitation. In addition, outpatient clinics such as
the Hospital's emergency room and "shortstay" unit ...may raise special
considerations because of the nature of services rendered to patients there.
In discharging its responsibility for administration of the Act, the Board
must frame its rules and administer them with careful attention to the wide
variety of activities within the modern hospital.
Id at 789-90 n. 16.
161. Id at 792 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
162. Id While the Chief Justice did note his strong disagreement with the ap-
proach taken by the majority, he did not fully develop what his version of the proper
approach would be. Id The Chief Justice did, however, allude to an example: "A
religious choir singing in a hospital chapel may well be desirable but if that interferes
with patient care, it cannot be allowed." Id at 791 (Burger, J., concurring).
163. See id at 791-93 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
164. See id
165. Id at 793 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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dors occupied by patients. 166 Justice Brennan maintained that the Board's
presumption applied as equally to these areas as it did to others, and sug-
gested that the courts should not be second guessing the Board's handling of
its "difficult and delicate responsibility."'
' 67
4. Baylor University Medical Center v. NLRB
The most recent case in the area of solicitation in the health-care indus-
try was Baylor Un'verst'ty Medical Center v. NLRB (Baylor III). 168 After a tortu-
ous sojourn through the federal courts, 169 Bay/or III came before the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 170 Baylor University Medical
Center, a multi-hospital complex located in Dallas, Texas, promulgated a
rule which prohibited union solicitation of employees in areas where such
conduct was likely to disturb persons visiting hospital patients.' 7' The only
issue that remained on this hearing before the Court of Appeals was the
propriety of the hospital's rule forbidding union solicitation of employees in
the hospital's vending area and cafeteria. 172 On remand from the District of
Columbia Circuit's decision in a prior phase of the case, 17 3 the Board had
disapproved the ban as to those areas. 1 74  The appellate court, however,
again remanded the case because it found there was not substantial evidence
to support a complete disapproval. 175 The court held that the Board had
not given sufficient consideration, itter aha, to alternative methods of reach-
ing employees.' 76 Thus, in Bay/or III a court of appeals for the first time
166. Id at 796 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan pointed'to that part
of the majority opinion in which the Court expressed serious doubt about the breadth
of the presumption. Id (citing 442 U.S. at 788-89).
167. Id at 796-98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
168. 662 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
169. Id at 57. For the other attempts at resolving the issues involved, see Baylor
Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Baylor I) vacated i
part and remanded, 439 U.S. 9 (1978), on remand, Baylor Univ. Medical Center v.
NLRB, 593 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Baylor II).
170. 662 F.2d at 56.
171. Id at 59. The full text of the rule read as follows:
Solicitation of employees of Baylor University Medical Center by other em-
ployees or distribution of literature between employees is prohibited during
work time and/or in work areas. The term "work areas" includes patient
care floors, hallways, elevators or any other area, such as laboratories, sur-
gery or treatment centers, where any type of service is being administered to
or on behalf of patients and also includes any areas where persons visiting
patients are likely to be disturbed. Service to our patients and their visitors




173. See Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 593 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1979). For the
prior history of the Bay/or case, see note 169 supra.
174. 247 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1980).
175. See 662 F.2d at 65.
176. Id at 63-65. In supporting its decision to remand, the court of appeals
stated, "In non-hospital cases the availability of alternative areas for solicitation is
1982-83]
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made the consideration of alternative methods of reaching employees dispos-
itive, '77 and thus completed the development of a trend which had begun in
Beth Israel,178 and which had gained added strength in Baptist Hospital.179
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Republic Aviation Presumption Should Not Be Applied in the Health-
Care Setting
In Beth Israel, the hospital argued that the congressional policy underly-
ing the 1974 amendments to the Act' 80 precluded the application of the
Republ'c Aviation presumption to health-care facilities.'," The Court prop-
erly rejected this argument, stating that nothing in the legislative history of
the amendments called for such an approach to resolving problems concern-
ing the section 7 rights of employees.' 8 2 Weighing heavily upon the Court's
interpretation of that legislative history was the fact that the amendments
contained special notice provisions concerning strikes, but remained silent on
the issue of solicitation. 183 The Court thus correctly concluded that in en-
acting the 1974 amendments, Congress chose to rely upon the Board to de-
termine the appropriate balance of the competing concerns of employers,
employees, and patients in the health-care setting.184 Accepting the Court's
analysis of congressional intent, care must be taken to avoid the notion that
the Board is given a free hand to determine what the law will be in this
area.'8 5 As will be developed in the analysis which follows, it is the Court's
failure to critically analyze the Board's balancing of interests that has re-
sulted in the improper application of the Republic Aviation solicitation pre-
sumption for the industrial setting to the very different environment found
in the health-care industry.186
In its landmark decision in Republic Aviation, the Supreme Court upheld
irrelevant to the determination of whether a ban on solicitation is valid. The
Supreme Court has recognized, however, that different considerations in the health-
care context make proper any inquiry into the availability of alternative areas." Id.
at 63.
177. Id
178. See 437 U.S. at 505. For a discussion of Beth Israel, see notes 88-136 and
accompanying text supra.
179. See 442 U.S. at 785. For a discussion of Baptist Hospital, see notes 137-67
and accompanying text supra.
180. For a discussion of the 1974 Amendments to the Act, see note 3 and accom-
panying text supra.
181. See 437 U.S. at 483.
182. Id at 496. For a discussion of this rejection by the Beth Israel Court, see
notes 99-105 and accompanying text supra.
183. 437 U.S. at 497.
184. See id.
185. For a discussion of the latitude enjoyed by the Board in this area, see notes
88-167 and accompanying text supra.
186. For a discussion of the rationality of applying the presumption in a health-
care setting, see notes 187-206 and accompanying text infra.
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the Board's right to adopt presumptions.' 87 However, it limited this right by
noting that the validity of a presumption depends upon "the rationality be-
tween what is proved and what is inferred."' 188 It is submitted that the ra-
tionality found to exist between a broad no-solicitation rule and the
presumption of invalidity in an industrial setting cannot automatically be
transferred to other work-settings, such as those found in health-care institu-
tions. The major distinction between an industrial setting and a hospital or
similar health-care institution, where the tentative application of that same
presumption has produced sharp criticism, 189 is the need for a tranquil at-
mosphere. This factor is entirely absent in the usual industrial setting such
as the one in Republic Aviation itself. 190 The differences in facilities and work-
ing conditions between these two settings are sufficiently great that to auto-
matically apply the presumption to the health-care industry would sever the
necessary link between the facts proved and the inferences drawn
therefrom. 191
That the application of the Republic Aviation presumption of invalidity
reached a just result in Beth Israel is not disputed herein. However, the result
reached was justifiable only because, under the peculiar facts in Beth Israel,
the cafeteria involved was factually indistinguishable from a typical indus-
trial cafeteria.i 92 This will not always be the case, as was pointed out by
Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in Beth Israel, where he expressed
concern that Beth Israel, with its unusual facts, might be used as precedent
for all hospital eating facility cases, and thus might take the Court further
towards promoting liberal employee solicitation rights than it would have
chosen to go had a more ordinary case been the first to reach it. 19 3
The concern expressed by Justice Blackmun is his concurring opinion in
Beth Israel' 94 was borne out by the subsequent decision in Baptist Hospital. 195
It is submitted that the problem regarding the Repubhc Aviation presumption
to health-care solicitation disputes lies in the Court's blithe application of
the presumption, without having first determined whether the rational con-
nection that exists in the industrial setting between the underlying facts and
the presumption adopted, is also present in a health-care setting. It is sub-
187. 324 U.S. at 804.
188. Id. at 804-05.
189. For a discussion of the criticisms that have followed the presumption's ap-
plication in the health-care context, see notes 121-31 & 159-67 and accompanying
text supra.
190. See 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
191. 437 U.S. at 511 (Powell, J., concurring). See also 442 U.S. at 792 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
192. See 437 U.S. at 489-91. For a discussion of the factual peculiarity of Beth
Israel, see notes 89-98 & 121-26 and accompanying text supra.
193. Id at 508-09 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
194. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring).
195. See 442 U.S. at 773. For a discussion of Baptist Hospital, see notes 90-110
and accompanying text supra.
1982-83]
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss3/4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
mitted that such a connection is not present between the hospital setting and
this presumption.
While the Court in Baptist Hospital again applied the Republic Aviation
presumption of invalidity in a health-care setting,196 the number of justices
who quarrelled with its applicability dropped from four in Beth Israel'9 7 to
two in Baptist Hospital.'98 In fact, Justice Powell, who had been at the fore-
front in Beth Israel in condemning the presumption's use in hospital situa-
tions, 199 authored the Baptist Hospital opinion only a year later.20° It is
submitted that the law of the Beth Israel case, formulated under a peculiar
fact situation, was incorrectly carried forward and viewed as precedent when
the Court decided Baptit Hospital. The Court itself seems less than certain
about the propriety of applying the Republic Aviation presumption in health-
care settings. The majority opinion in Beth Israel incorporated language
from the court of appeals decision in that case, which stated that the Board
should stand ready to revise its rulings if future experience would show that,
in fact, the well-being of patients was being jeopardized by the current ap-
proach.20 1 A year later in Baptist Hospital, the majority opinion noted that
the Board should be mindful of the Court's admonition in Beth Israel.
20 2
Noting the very tentative nature of the Court's application of the Repub-
1ic Aviation presumption to health-care institutions, Justice Brennan at-
tempted to place the presumption's applicability to such situations upon a
firmer footing in a separate concurrence in Baptist hIospital.2 0 3 He contended
that there was no need to "second-guess" the Board's handling of such a
"difficult and delicate" matter.20 4 It is respectfully submitted that Justice
Brennan's analysis misconstrues the nature of the presumption; it is an issue
of law, not one of fact. Where the rational relationship between a presump-
tion and the facts upon which it is based is lacking, the presumption cannot
stand. The "delicate" nature of a particular area of law does not lessen nor
obviate the essential requirement of this rational relationship.
It must be remembered that to remove the Republic Aviation presump-
196. See id.
197. See 437 U.S. at 483. In Beth Israel, Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
quist and Chief Justice Burger went on record against the application of the Republic
Avition presumption as the proper method to resolve employee solicitation questions
in the health-care field. Id
198. See 442 U.S. at 773. In Baptist Hosptal, only Justices Burger and Blackmun
questioned the applicability of the presumption. Id. at 791-92 (Blackmun, J. & Bur-
ger, C.J., concurring). Even this must be qualified because Justice Blackmun's chal-
lenge to the presumption was somewhat less than direct. See id. at 791. Chief Justice
Burger, in contrast, explained precisely why he felt the presumption had no place in
health-care solicitation problems. Id.
199. See 437 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J., concurring).
200. See 442 U.S. 773 (1979).
201. 437 U.S. at 508 (quoting NLRB v. Beth Israel Hosp., 554 F.2d 477, 481 (1st
Cir. 1977)).
202. 442 U.S. at 790.
203. Id. at 793-97 (Brennan, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 797 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tion from the health-care setting does not mean that health-care employees
are barred from gaining access to fellow employees for union organizational
purposes. Over the course of time, a set of rules must be developed to give
health-care unions, as well as employers, standards upon which to base their
conduct regarding employee solicitation and no-solicitation rules.20 5 How-
ever, as things presently stand, the improper application of the Repubhc Avia-
tion industrial standard to the wholly different setting of a health-care
facility is producing much uncertainty, 20 6 as well as overlooking the needs of
the hospitals and other health-care institutions in carrying out their primary
function of seeing to the physical and emotional needs of their patients.
A final effect of the unwarranted application of the Republic Aviation
presumption to the health-care settings is that it could weaken the effect of
the presumption in the industrial setting, where it has proven so effective
over the many years since its inception.
20 7
B. The Republic Aviation Presumption Has Effectively Been Cast Aside in
Health-Care Solicitation Cases While Continuing to Receive Lip-
Service From the Court
In Beth Israel, the Supreme Court was split five to four in favor of apply-
ing the Repubhc Aviation presumption to a health-care facility.208 As previ-
ously noted, the number of justices going on record against the applicability
of the presumption only a year later in Baptist Hospital dropped from four to
two.20 9 It is nevertheless submitted that support for the presumption is wan-
ing and that the Court in Baptist Hospital, while purporting to apply the
Repubhc Aviation presumption, has begun the formation of a separate set of
guidelines for health-care facilities.
2 10
Although the Court continues to formally apply the presumption, the
facts of each case are actually being examined from a neutral perspective.
While the distinction between allowing special circumstances to rebut an
applied presumption and not applying the presumption at all is a very subtle
205. Since the act was only amended in 1974 to include employees in the non-
profit health-care field, it is not surprising that clear standards cannot as yet be
determined.
206. For a discussion of the argument that uncertainty has followed the applica-
tion of the presumption to the health-care setting, see notes 208-13 and accompany-
ing text infia.
207. In the years since Repubhc Aviation was decided, it has become one of the
most cited labor cases and is properly referred to as a landmark Supreme Court case.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964); Local 357 Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 680 (1961); NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 109 (1956); NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226,
229 (1948); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95 (1947).
208. For a discussion of the split in Beth Israel, see notes 88-136 and accompany-
ing text supra.
209. For a discussion of the split in Baptist Hospital, see notes 137-67 and accom-
panying text supra.
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one, the fact that it shifts the burden of proof can be determinative in cases
where only a small amount of evidence is placed before a tribunal.
In the majority opinion in Baptist Hospital, Justice Powell questioned
the propriety of extending the Republic Aviation presumption to a hospital
setting but ultimately upheld the Board's use of the presumption in deciding
the case.2 11 Further, in resolving the case, the Court in Baptist Hospital prop-
erly gave great weight to testimony by doctors and hospital administrators
that the observation of union solicitation could have an adverse effect upon
patients' recoveries. 2 12 It is submitted that a generous reading of Baptist Hos-
pital supports the proposition that the Court may require that such testi-
mony be given conclusive weight by the Board in future cases. Because of
the Court's heavy emphasis on medical testimony and the dicta suggesting
the presumption's inapplicability in health-care cases, 2 13 it is suggested that
in health-care situations the presumption has effectively been cast aside in
favor of an analysis from a more neutral perspective.
The result of the use of a neutral perspective while still purporting to
apply the presumption is a total lack of predictability for unions and health-
care institutions in framing their solicitation policies. 2 14 It is submitted that
by "covering itself" in this manner, whether intentionally or unintentionally,
the Supreme Court has put both labor and management into the position of
guessing whether, under the facts of a particular case, the Board and the
courts will truly follow the Republic Aviation presumption or will examine the
facts from a neutral perspective when a health-care institution is involved.
21 5
To avoid this result, the Board and the Court should formally recognize that
the special circumstances have overtaken the rule, making the Republic Avia-
tion presumption inapplicable in health-care settings.
C. If the Presumption Prevails, the Retail Store Exception Should be Apphed to
Hospital Retail Areas Such as Cafeterias and Gif? Shops
While it is technically correct to say that the Republic Aviation presump-
tion of invalidity applies to retail establishments and is rebutted by a show-
ing that patrons on the selling floor could overhear employee solicitati6n
efforts, 21 6 the simpler approach is to view the retail setting as sufficient to
automatically cast aside the presumption without looking to the specific facts
of each case.2 17 In fact, the presumption of invalidity will not be applied
211. 442 U.S. at 789.
212. See id at 782-85.
213. For a discussion of the dicta, see note 155 and accompanying text supra.
214. For a discussion of the unpredictability brought on by the Court's ap-
proach, see text accompanying note 215 infra.
215. For a discussion of the effect of the presumption upon management and
labor, see notes 208-10 and accompanying text supra.
216. For a discussion of the rationale behind the retail store exception, see R.
GORMAN, supra note 2, at 181.
217. For a discussion of the retail store exception, see notes 48-53 and accompa-
nying text supra.
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once an employer establishes the requirements for the retail store excep-
tion.218 Thus, an employer in a retail store solicitation dispute will not be
required to produce evidence that his broad no-solicitation rule is necessary
"in order to maintain production or discipline" 219 as would be required of
his industrial counterpart in an otherwise similar dispute. 220 The Court has
recognized that the potential disruption of the employer's business resulting
from patrons being exposed to employee solicitation efforts calls for striking
the balance in this manner. 221
In Beth Israel, the Court refused to apply the retail store exception, giv-
ing the issue very little consideration. 222 The Court noted that the "primary
purpose" of a hospital differs from that of a retail establishment, and there-
fore rejected the invitation to apply the retail exception to the hospital cafe-
teria. 223 It is submitted, however, that the Court failed to properly analyze
the cases which have developed this exception to the Repubhc Aviation pre-
sumption of invalidity. 224 It is submitted that the Court, having decided to
apply the Republic Aviation presumption, should have also applied the retail
store exception, notwithstanding the fact that the "primary purpose" of a
hospital is to provide for the well-being of its patients. The fault in the Beth
Israel majority's "primary purpose" distinction was exposed by Justice Pow-
ell in his concurring opinion.225 As he pointed out, the Board has applied
the retail store exception to public restaurants located on the premises of
retail stores despite the fact that the primary selling function of the stores
does not take place in those restaurants. 2 26 In the same way that a cafeteria
in a large department store supplements the store's overall operation, the
primary purpose of which is selling merchandise, the cafeteria and gift shop
in a hospital supplement its overall operation, the primary purpose of which
is patient care. Therefore, it is submitted that there is no justifiable reason
for divergent applications of the retail store exception in these two settings.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Beth Israel, this logic had been ac-
cepted by some lower federal courts. 227 It is submitted that these decisions
evince the proper approach.
218. See R. GORMAN, supra note 2, at 179-81.
219. Id
220. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1973). For
a discussion of McDonnell Douglas, see notes 38-47 and accompanying text supra.
221. 437 U.S. at 506-07.
222. Id
223. Id
224. For a discussion of the Court's analysis, see notes 111-15 and accompanying
text supra.
225. 437 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J., concurring).
226. Id at 513 (citing McDonalds Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 404 (1973); Goldblatt
Bros. Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1949)).
227. See Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 351, 357-61 (1978);
St. John's Hosp. & School of Nursing, 557 F.2d 1368, 1375 (1977).
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Aside from the faulty "primary purpose" distinction, 228 the majority
opinion in Beth Israel reveals no logical basis for refusing to apply the retail
store exception to hospital cafeterias and gift shops. Further, the Court, in
deciding Baptist Hospital one year later, completely failed to focus upon the
retail store exception. 2 29 Two of the justices recognized this error in the
Court's logic, and refused to allow it to pass unchallenged.
230
It was previously suggested that, while the Court purports to apply the
Repubh'c Aviation presumption in health-care settings, it has actually been an-
alyzing the facts of each particular case from a much more neutral perspec-
tive.2 31 The result of this approach is to allow hospitals to promulgate
broader no-solicitation rules where patients and visitors are potentially ex-
posed to union solicitation efforts. 2 32 It is submitted that while the Court
thus seems to give the hospital greater control over its employees, it under-
mines this generosity by refusing to allow the application of the retail store
exception in hospital cafeterias and gift shops.233 While this may appear to
strike the appropriate balance between the union's right of access to the em-
ployees and the hospital's concern for the well-being of its patients, it is sub-
mitted that it is not an acceptable method for solving the delicate problem of
employee solicitations in the health-care field.
D. A Suggested Approach to Handhg Employee Solicitation Problems in The
Health-Care Field
When confronted with the guaranteed organizational rights of employ-
ees protected by the Act on the one hand, and the delicate issue of proper
hospital patient care on the other, it is apparent that striking the appropriate
balance between these sometimes conflicting aims is naturally a very difficult
task. To err in the usual industrial setting on the side of freer solicitation
rights is to hamper productivity and discipline, which are no doubt serious
concerns. However, to err in the health-care setting on the side of freer solic-
itation is to impede the physical and emotional recovery of human beings.
This is certainly a more serious matter and deserves greater weight in the
balancing of interests.
The Board and the courts have arguably reached the appropriate result
in each particular case by following the approach that seems to be set forth
228. For a discussion of the Court's "primary purpose" reasoning, see note 114
and accompanying text supra.
229. 442 U.S. at 777.
230. Id at 791 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
231. For a discussion of the approach the Court seems to be taking while pur-
porting to apply the Republic Aviation presumption, see notes 208-15 and accompany-
ing text supra.
232. For a discussion of the result of the present approach, see notes 88-167 and
accompanying text supra.
233. For a discussion of the Court's approach regarding the retail store excep-
tion, see notes 111-15 and accompanying text supra.
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in Baptist Hospital.2 3 4 In every case, a health-care facility could produce
testimony of doctors and administrators that solicitation in any area to
which patients or visitors are exposed will adversely affect the recovery of
patients. 235 Depending on how far the Board will go in honoring this testi-
mony, it could justify limiting or allowing solicitation in any disputed area.
However, as has been argued, this approach to solving health-care solicita-
tion cases is unacceptable due to the unpredictability it brings about from
the perspective of both labor and management.
A more viable alternative exists. When first confronted with the diffi-
cult issue of employee solicitation in the health-care field, the Supreme
Court, in Beth Israel, suggested that while the availability of alternative
means of reaching the employees is not a factor in resolving industrial em-
ployee solicitation cases, this factor gains in importance when the more sub-
stantial interests of a health-care setting are involved.2 36 This dicta received
added strength in Baptist Hospital, where it was quoted approvingly by the
majority opinion. 237 Finally, the Bay/or III decision by the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit recognized the strength and logic of this dicta and relied
heavily upon the alternative means analysis in confronting the solicitation
issue. 23
8
Under an "alternative means" analysis, the Board, when confronted
with a solicitation problem in a health-care setting, should first look to
whether the health-care facility imposing a no-solicitation rule in pa-
tient/visitor access areas has provided areas where all employees could be
reached regularly by other employees for union organizational or solicitation
purposes. Such areas could include locker rooms, lounges, employee parking
areas or employee-only cafeterias. If the facility could produce evidence that
it had provided such alternative areas, the facility's evidence that solicitation
in other areas of the hospital could have an adverse effect upon patient care
should be given conclusive weight. On the other hand, should the facility be
unable to provide such alternative means of access to employees for organi-
zational purposes, the facility's evidence of patient care disruption should be
viewed as only a factor and, at that, even more skeptically-as a possible
ruse intended to hamper union organizational efforts. The existence of alter-
native means of reaching employees should not be conclusive in a determina-
tion of the hospital's intent in promulgating a broad no-solicitation rule, but
would be a strong factor in the analysis, and, perhaps over the course of
time, could form the basis for a presumption that when such alternatives
234. For a discussion of the Baptist Hospital approach, see notes 137-67 and ac-
companying text supra.
235. For a discussion of the medical testimony involved in health-care solitica-
tion disputes, see notes 145-54 and accompanying text supra.
236. See 437 U.S. at 505. For a discussion of alternative means in Beth Israel, see
notes 119-20 and accompanying text supra.
237. See 442 U.S. at 785. For a discussion of alternative means in Baptist lospi-
tal, see notes 157-58 and accompanying text supra.
238. See 662 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For a discussion of alternative means in
Baylor III, see notes 168-79 and accompanying text supra.
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exist, a ban on solicitation in other areas is valid. Adoption of such a stan-
dard would put health-care facilities on notice that, should they desire to
successfully ban solicitation in patient/visitor access areas, they must provide
alternative areas for employees to be reached for organizational purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been suggested herein that the current approach to employee so-
licitation disputes in the health-care industry has resulted in unpredictability
for both labor and management in approaching and resolving the issue of
employee solicitation. 239 It is submitted that an analysis which focuses upon
the availability of alternative means of access to employees provides a better
resolution of the health-care solicitation problem than does the current ap-
proach taken by the Board and the Supreme Court. 240 It is not suggested
that this approach will resolve all solicitation problems in the health-care
area. For instance, the issue of what alternatives will amount to "adequate
alternatives" is one that remains to be defined. It is suggested, however, that
for purposes of injecting predictability and logic into the law, the approach
suggested above would result in a sorely needed change in the Board's ap-
proach to health-care solicitation disputes.
Michael A. Curle
239. For a discussion of the unpredictability brought about by the current ap-
proach, see notes 208-15 and accompanying text supra.
240. For a discussion of the proposed approach to health-care solicitation dis-
putes, see notes 234-38 and accompanying text supra.
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